Founder Vesting, Reverse Dilution, and Governance Pitfalls in Growth-Stage Term Sheets
A legal dissection of liquidation preference traps, affirmative voting deadlocks, and dynamic co-founder equity covenants under Indian corporate law.
Anatomy of the Growth-Stage Term Sheet
In early financing rounds, founder enthusiasm often obscures subtle legal mechanisms embedded within institutional term sheets. By Series A and B, clauses concerning reverse vesting, liquidation preferences, and affirmative voting rights can dramatically alter the balance of operational control.
Our practice frequently encounters founders who signed standard boilerplate investor covenants only to discover during key operational milestones that routine managerial appointments or credit facilities require unanimous board approval.
Reverse Vesting: Good Leaver vs. Bad Leaver
Reverse vesting provisions require founders to earn back their existing equity over a multi-year schedule. While institutional investors reasonably seek continuity, the definitions of 'Good Leaver' and 'Bad Leaver' must be fiercely negotiated. Being terminated without cause, disability, or resigning due to fundamental corporate deadlock must never trigger involuntary forfeiture of earned shares at face value.
Affirmative Voting Deadlocks
Affirmative voting rights (reserved matters) should be strictly confined to fundamental corporate actions—such as winding up, altering capital structure, or related-party transactions—rather than day-to-day operational budgets or mid-level hiring.
Preserving Operational Autonomy
Clear dispute escalation mechanisms, including time-bound mediation and Russian roulette or Texas shoot-out buy-sell provisions, provide indispensable safety valves against catastrophic governance stalemates.
Vikramaditya Singhania
Partner — Corporate & Commercial Practice
